Conceptual Truths, Strong Possibilities and Our Knowledge of Metaphysical Necessities by Nimtz, Christian
 Philosophia Scientiæ
Travaux d'histoire et de philosophie des sciences 
16-2 | 2012
Modal Matters
Conceptual Truths, Strong Possibilities and Our









Date of publication: 1 October 2012





Christian Nimtz, « Conceptual Truths, Strong Possibilities and Our Knowledge of Metaphysical
Necessities », Philosophia Scientiæ [Online], 16-2 | 2012, Online since 01 October 2015, connection on
01 May 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/735  ; DOI : 10.4000/
philosophiascientiae.735 
Tous droits réservés
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Bielefeld University (Germany)
Résumé : Dans mon article, je soutiens qu’il existe une voie épistémique fiable
qui mène de la connaissance des vérités conceptuelles à celle des nécessités mé-
taphysiques. Dans un premier temps, je montre que nous pouvons prétendre
connaître des vérités conceptuelles dans la mesure où nous savons à quelles
conditions nos termes (ou du moins un grand nombre d’entre eux) s’appliquent.
Je défends notamment cette idée face à un argument récent que Williamson
adresse à la conception épistémique de l’analyticité. Dans un second temps, je
montre que notre connaissance des vérités conceptuelles constitue un moyen
fiable de connaître des nécessités métaphysiques. En effet, de deux choses l’une :
ou bien la connaissance conceptuelle conduit directement à la connaissance de
nécessités métaphysiques ; ou bien, lorsque ce n’est pas le cas, nous pouvons
du moins savoir qu’une telle inférence n’est pas permise, en vertu d’une ré-
flexion purement sémantique, « depuis notre fauteuil » (armchair). J’en conclus
que la connaissance conceptuelle constitue un moyen sûr d’acquérir des connais-
sances modales.
Abstract: I argue that there is a reliable epistemic route from knowledge of con-
ceptual truths to knowledge of metaphysical necessities. In a first step, I argue
that we possess knowledge of conceptual truths since we know what (many of)
our terms apply to. I bolster this line of thought with a rebuttal of Williamson’s
recent argument against epistemic analyticity. In a second step, I argue that our
knowledge of conceptual truths allows us to reliably attain knowledge of meta-
physical necessities. Either this knowledge straightforwardly yields knowledge
of metaphysical necessities. Or it is such that we can by armchair semantic re-
flection discover that it fails to do so. I conclude that conceptual knowledge
provides a safe route to modal knowledge.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 16 (2), 2012, 39–58.
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1 The simple argument introduced
The category of metaphysically necessary statements 1—of metaphysical neces-
sities, for short—is widely held to be of particular importance to philosophical
inquiry. Following Kripke [Kripke 1980, 34–60], everyone agrees that meta-
physical necessity contrasts with the traditional categories of logical, conceptual
and nomological necessity in that there are metaphysical necessities that cannot
be discovered by a priori reflection, in that there are metaphysical necessities
that aren’t analytic, and in that metaphysical necessities hold true in all possible
worlds simpliciter. Beyond this, there is no consensus on what makes a neces-
sity ametaphysical necessity, or what marks off metaphysical modality in general
[Cameron 2009].
Metaphysical necessity poses two interlocked puzzles. On the one hand,
there is the metaphysical puzzle of what, if anything, grounds metaphysical
modality [Cameron 2010], [Hale & Hoffmann 2010, part I]. On the other hand,
there is the epistemic puzzle of how we may arrive at knowledge of metaphys-
ical necessities [Vaidya 2007], [Roca-Royes 2011], [McLeod 2005], [Hale &
Hoffmann 2010, part II]. I will be dealing with the epistemic puzzle. I argue
that our ordinary knowledge of conceptual truths, knowledge we possess since
we knowwhat (many of) our terms semantically apply to, 2 is a reliable epistemic
source of, and hence a reliable route to, knowledge of metaphysical necessities.
(I will often shorten ‘knowledge of conceptual truths’ to ‘conceptual knowledge’,
and unless indicated otherwise, I will take ‘modal knowledge’ to mean ‘meta-
physically modal knowledge’.) Here is the argument I put forth. I call it the
simple argument for modal knowledge, or just the simple argument:
(1) We possess conceptual knowledge, since we know for (many of) our terms
what they semantically apply to.
(2) Any item of conceptual knowledge we so possess either ipso facto is knowl-
edge of a metaphysical necessity. Or the conceptual knowledge we are con-
cerned with is such that we can reliably determine that it does not lead to
modal knowledge.
Hence:
(3) The conceptual knowledge we possess since we know what (many of) our
terms apply to reliably yields knowledge of metaphysical necessities.
That conceptual knowledge yields modal knowledge has been argued before,
notably by Peacocke and Bealer. So let me accentuate what is distinctive about
the simple argument.
1. As I employ the term, a ‘statement’ is an interpreted sentence.
2. The “semantically” in “semantically applies” is of course redundant. For to say of a
term ‘F ’ that it applies to something just is to mark off one of its semantic properties. I put
the ‘semantically’ in for emphasis.
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Peacocke and Bealer both draw on bold background designs. In his actualist
metaphysics of modality, Peacocke postulates implicitly known general princi-
ples that at the same time govern modality, and give rise to modal knowledge
[Peacocke 1999], [Peacocke 2002]. This scheme has proved controversial both
in technical detail [Williamson 2002] and in principle [Rosen 2002]. Bealer
enlists an understanding of concepts as sparse ante rem universals with charac-
teristic possession conditions [Bealer 2000, esp. 21ff], [Peacocke 1999, 299f],
[Sosa 1998]. On his view, a thinker A determinately possesses some concept C
only if, simply put, As rational intuitions track the true nature of the property of
being C. Determinate concept possession thereby virtually ensures modal knowl-
edge, but it turns out to be exceedingly demanding. On these standards, few
humans (if any) will ever determinately possess a concept. That is why Bealer
[Bealer 2000, 12, 23f] merely argues that determinate concept possession is
metaphysically possible.
The simple argument contrasts sharply with either approach. It rests nei-
ther on an ambitious metaphysics of modality, nor on an extravagant theory of
concept possession. The argument is designed to be, well, simple. It aims to
establish a connection between knowledge of conceptual truths and knowledge
of metaphysical necessities drawing on widely shared views of our knowledge
of our terms’ semantic properties, and on ideas about modality that are deeply
entrenched in the standard view of modal space.
Here is what I will do. I begin by arguing that, since we know how we
do and would apply our terms (§ 2) and since, as neo-descriptivists and ortho-
dox Kripkeans agree, considered application often determines semantic proper-
ties, we often know what our terms semantically apply to, and thereby possess
conceptual knowledge (§ 3). I go on to defuse Williamson’s recent charge that
there is no conceptual knowledge, since there are no epistemic analyticities (§ 4).
Drawing on common ideas about modal space, I then argue that all defeaters to
the universal rule that knowledge of conceptual truths is ipso facto knowledge of
metaphysical necessities are, as it were, harmless. I conclude that the conceptual
knowledge we possess since we know what (many of) our terms apply to does in-
deed give rise to modal knowledge (§ 5). I close by reviewing my argument, and
by wondering whether there is anything left to do in modal epistemology (§ 6).
2 From considered application to knowledge
of notions
The simple argument rests on the epistemological premise that:
(1) We possess conceptual knowledge, since we know for (many of) our terms
what they apply to.
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This premise combines two claims: (i) we do have knowledge of conceptual
truths, and (ii) we do have knowledge of conceptual truth since we know for
(many of) our terms what they apply to. Either claim may appear contentious.
Yet if we start from mundane facts about how we use language and work our
way up to standard semantic theories, we find that there should be sufficient
common ground to support both. 3
Here is a patent truth about the way we use language: To which entities
we do and would apply our (classificatory) terms depends on the properties we
take those entities to have. For example, I call a liquid ‘flammable’ because I
take it to ignite easily, I call John a ‘liar’ because I take him to have intentionally
presented a falsehood as truth, and I call Venus a ‘planet’ because I take it that
it meets the criteria laid down by the IAU. These characterizations aptly reveal
what properties the considered application of my terms is sensitive to. After all,
they all sustain the pertinent counterfactuals. It is not just that I do call a liquid
‘flammable’ if I take it to ignite easily. I also would call a liquid ‘flammable’ if I
were to take it to ignite easily.
In order to coin some terminology apt to generalize these observations, let
the notion a speaker associates with some term ‘F ’ 4 be the conditions something
has to satisfy such that the speaker does and would, on reflection, apply ‘F ’ to
it. The notion someone associates with a term ‘F ’ guides her application of that
term. That is simply to say that she does and would apply ‘F ’ to something if
she takes it to satisfy that notion. As revealed above, the notion I associate with
‘flammable’ is being such that it ignites easily, as this is what guides my considered
application of the term. Please note that, as introduced, the notion of a ‘notion’
belongs to the theory of language use. Whether it is of relevance to semantics
depends on the relevance of language use to semantics. (I will come back to this
in the next section.)
The observations about language use rehearsed above sustain two general
claims about notions. First, UBIQUITY: We quite generally associate notions with
our terms guiding how we do and would reflectively apply them. The reason for
this is plain to see. Our considered application of (classificatory) terms depends
on the properties we take those entities to have. But notions just are the very
properties our considered application is sensitive to. Hence, we quite generally
associate notions with our terms guiding our considered application.
Secondly, ACCESS: We have readily available, yet presumably mostly tacit,
non-trivial knowledge of what the notions we associate with our terms are. I
call something a ‘planet’ because I take it to satisfy the notion I associate with
‘planet’. That of course requires me to have readily available non-trivial knowl-
edge of what this associated notion is, otherwise my considered application
3. For the following, see also [Nimtz 2010, 200ff]. With less emphasis on language
use, Jackson [Jackson 2007a], [Jackson 2010] presents a similar line.
4. I throughout employ quotation marks in lieu of Quine-quotes.
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could not be sensitive to the conditions the notion encapsulates. Such an associ-
ation will quite generally be forged by beliefs and/or dispositions on the part of
the subject, and there is no guarantee that the readily available knowledge this
yields will be explicit rather than tacit.
Still, we have no reason to think that our explicit armchair judgments on
what we do and would apply our terms to are customarily unreliable. On the
contrary, we quite generally find that our considered use is basically what we
consider it to be. It hence is hardly surprising that (almost) everyone in phi-
losophy treats speakers’ answers to questions such as “Would you call an easily
ignitable liquid ‘flammable’?” or “Would you call a woollen bonnet a ‘hat’?” as
revealing their considered use—given that we allow them to reflect on the ques-
tion, that we describe or present the relevant items with sufficient care, and that
we present contrasting cases. Think of Kripke [Kripke 1980, 82ff] and Putnam
[Putnam 1975, 223–227] on the one hand. Think of experimental philosophers
on the other hand [Knobe & Nichols 2008]. For all their disagreement, they
agree that subjects can reliably tell how they do and would apply their terms in
specific possible cases.
Our armchair reflection on how we do and would apply our terms is arguably
fit to reliably provide partial accounts of the notions we associate with our terms,
or so everyone agrees. This consensus carries no assurance that coming up with
a comprehensive account of any of our notions will be a simple affair. On the
contrary, we typically need to generalize from the considered judgments we find
ourselves making with respect to a limited assortment of possible cases. By con-
sequence, our armchair-based accounts of the notions guiding our considered
application are typically conjectural, always defeasible, and very often provi-
sional. But we can apparently rest assured that providing explicit, if partial,
accounts of the notions guiding the application of terms such as ‘knowledge’,
‘circle’, ‘neighbour’, ‘poisonous’, ‘uncle’, ‘I’ or ‘flammable’ is typically not beyond
our epistemic ken.
3 From knowledge of notions to conceptual
knowledge
I have argued that we associate notions with our terms guiding our considered
application, and that we can (at least often and partially) determine what these
notions are. These are claims about language use. Thus far, I have made no
claims about semantic properties. So let us turn from use to semantics and
ask: Do the notions guiding our considered application affect or constrain the
semantic properties our terms have? Proponents of traditional descriptivism
emphatically think they do [Ayer 1946, chap. 1–3], [Hanfling 2000]. Embracing
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the slogan that use determines meaning, 5 traditional descriptivists hold that the
notion we associate with any of our terms straightaway determines what this
term semantically applies to. On this picture, ‘flammable’ or ‘gold’ as used by us
apply to items that ignite easily and to yellowish metal substances, respectively,
because these fit the notions we associate with these terms. The analogous holds
true for proper names such as ‘Nixon’, and indexicals such as ‘I’ or ‘here’. 6
There is almost universal agreement that the traditional descriptive
paradigm is flawed. What is controversial is whether it is beyond repair.
Orthodox Kripkeans forcefully maintain that it is [Kripke 1980, 82–87, 118,
124], [Putnam 1975], [Soames 2002]. They point out that proper names such as
‘Nixon’ and natural kind terms such as ‘water’ designate rigidly and that Nixon
and water thus could very well not have had the very properties we actually
identify them by, that we habitually defer in our application of kind and artefact
terms to experts in line with Putnam’s [Putnam 1975, 227f] famed ‘linguistic
division of labour’, and that our associated notions quite often contain factual
falsehoods such that, strictly speaking, nothing satisfies them. From this they
conclude that traditional descriptivism is fundamentally mistaken: The notions
we associate with names and natural kind terms are extraneous to their seman-
tics, or so orthodox Kripkeans maintain. What these terms do and would apply
to is rather determined by the very items or samples we find at the beginning of
the causal-historical chains our use of these terms belongs to [Kripke 1980, 91–
97]. For example, our term ‘gold’ applies to something o in some possible world
w iff (i) the actual causal-historical chain our use of ‘gold’ belongs to originated
with some sample k—maybe the producers of that term just ruled: “That (✑) is
gold”, pointing to k—and (ii) o is of the same natural kind as k.
Neo-descriptivists reject the causal-historical picture just sketched [Jackson
2010], [Jackson 2010, chap. 2], [Jackson 1998, chap. 2], [Lewis 1994],
[Chalmers 2004], [Nimtz 2010]. They think that a semantics loyal to the de-
scriptivist idea that our notions essentially fix the semantic properties of our
expressions can account for factual errors, deference, and rigid designation.
Factual errors are permitted since what a term applies to is fixed by best rather
than by perfect fit with the associated notion [Lewis 1997, 358f], [Lewis 1972,
253], [Lewis 1994, 298]. Deference is accounted for by allowing individual
notions to comprise explicitly deferential conditions along the lines of gold is
the goldish stuff of our acquaintance our experts accept as gold [Jackson 2004,
270–273]. Finally, rigid designation and the counterfactual variation in sur-
face properties that comes with it is accounted for by combining the idea that a
term’s application in a possible world is determined by a trans-world relation of
5. Here is a way to render precise what this slogan amounts to in our context: To hold
that use determines meanings is to hold that the reference-determining semantic values of
our terms (see [Lewis 1986, 27–55]) supervene on considered application alone.
6. Note that the idea that all terms are definable drawing on a limited stock of somehow
basic terms is not part of the descriptivists’ position. In fact, traditional descriptivists such
as Ayer [Ayer 1946, chap. 3] or Hanfling [Hanfling 2000] clearly reject this idea.
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sameness-of-natural-kind to an actual sample—vide clause (ii) of the Kripkean
proposal above—with the claim that this actual sample is determined by our
associated notion rather than by historic origin. On neo-descriptivist premises,
our term ‘gold’ applies to something o in some possible world w iff (i) there is a
sample k in the actual world such that k best fits the notion we associate with
‘gold’, and (ii) o is of the same natural kind as k.
Neo-decriptivists discern two perspectives we can take on possible worlds
[Jackson 1998, 47–51]. We can consider a possible world w as counterfactual.
To do so, “one acknowledges that the actual world is fixed, and thinks of a
possibility as a way the world might have been but is not” [Chalmers 2004,
159]—i.e., as a possible variation in how things are given that the actual world
is how it is. Let me call a world considered thus a counterfactual or C-world (in
symbols: ◻CS).These worlds capture the metaphysical dimension in modality in
that a statement S is metaphysically necessary iff S is true in all C-worlds. Or
we can consider a possible world as a possible variation in how things actually
are, as “representing a way the actual world might turn out to be” [Chalmers
2004, 159]. Let me call a world considered thus a counter-actual or A-world.
Counter-actual worlds are centred, i.e., they have at least a place, a time, and a
speaker/thinker highlighted. Taking conceptual truth and conceptual necessity
to be the very same thing, A-worlds afford a straightforward way to explain what
conceptual truth comes to: A statement S is conceptually necessary iff S holds
true in all A-worlds (in symbols: ◻AS).
Drawing on this modal distinction, neo-descriptivists can provide a quite
precise account of how associated notions affect semantic properties, thereby
making good on their idea that our notions are what essentially fixes what our
terms apply to. Our notions straightforwardly determine what our terms apply to
across all counter-actual worlds; a fortiori, they straightforwardly determine the
actual extensions our terms have. However things turn out to be, ‘flammable’ ap-
plies to what best fits my notion being such that it ignites easily, and ‘gold’ applies
to what best fits my notion being the goldish stuff of our acquaintance our experts
accept as gold. Yet what terms such as ‘gold’ apply to in some counterfactual
worlds might well not be what best satisfies the associated notion within that
world. As explained above, a term’s application across counterfactual worlds
will often be determined by what is of the same natural kind as the items or
samples the term actually applies to. Of course, this actual extension is always
straightforwardly fixed by the associated notion.
The pronounced differences in the semantic theories proffered by orthodox
Kripkeans and neo-descriptivists 7 should not blind us to their substantial agree-
ment. Their dispute concerns specific kinds of expressions, notably proper names
such as ‘Nixon’ and natural kind terms such as ‘gold’ or ‘tiger’—terms whose se-
mantic properties are, according to the typical orthodox Kripkean, fixed causal-
historically. Yet both parties agree that our language comprises quite a lot of
7. See e.g., [Spicer 2010] for a Kripkean rebuttal of neo-descriptivist ideas.
46 Christian Nimtz
expressions that, modulo deference, fit the traditional decriptivists’ paradigm.
Expressions such as ‘circle’, ‘neighbour’, ‘poisonous’, ‘uncle’ or ‘flammable’ are
cases in point. These do not designate rigidly, and the orthodox Kripkean
wouldn’t think that their application is determined causal-historically—no or-
thodox Kripkean is an externalist about ‘uncle’. Orthodox Kripkeans and neo-
descriptivists also agree that terms such as ‘I’ or ‘the actual winner of the Man
Booker Prize 2005’ fit the neo-descriptivists account in that they designate rigidly
whatever satisfies the associated descriptive condition, a condition that is encap-
sulated in the notion guiding our considered application of these terms. In the
end, then, orthodox Kripkean and neo-descriptivists agree that semantic prop-
erties are often determined by associated notions, yet quarrel over the range of
expressions actually fitting this model. Given that we can (at least often and
partially) determine what the notion we associate with a term is, we hence find
that Kripkeans and neo-descriptivists agree that we (at least often and partially)
know what our terms apply to.
So what we find is that (i) our considered application of our terms is guided
by the notions we associate with these expressions across the board, that (ii)
armchair reflection on how we do and would apply our terms is arguably fit to
reliably provide partial accounts of the notions we associate with our terms, and
that (iii) there is a broad consensus that, at least in many cases, our associated
notions determine the semantic properties of our terms. More precisely, if the
orthodox Kripkean is right, notions determine what our terms semantically ap-
ply to in many, yet by no means in all cases, whereas if the neo-descriptivists’
analysis holds true, notions determine at least application across counter-actual
worlds across the board. But given that we know what our terms apply to, we
ipso facto are in a position to have knowledge of conceptual truths. Since I know
that ‘uncle’ applies to male relatives, and that ‘circle’ applies to geometric figures,
I know that uncles are male relatives, and that circles are geometric figures.
I conclude that we have every reason to believe that we do possess knowl-
edge of conceptual truths, and that we do so since we know for (at least many
of) our terms what they semantically apply to. This fits nicely with our prethe-
oretical convictions. It seems very hard to deny that my knowledge of what my
terms apply to puts me in a position to accurately judge that, say, “You do not
know that p if p is false”, “Neighbours have neighbours”, “Uncles are relatives”
or “Hats are coverings of the head” hold true. In fact, any doubt on this matter
has a decidedly skeptical feel to it.
4 Against Williamson against epistemic
analyticity
Acknowledging conceptual knowledge commits us to acknowledge analytic
truths. At minimum, acknowledging conceptual knowledge requires us to ac-
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knowledge epistemically analytic truths held to be “such that one can determine
their truth-value merely by grasping the meanings of the terms that occur in
them” [Grayling 1997, 33], cf. also [Boghossian 1997, 334], [Boghossian 2003].
However, Williamson has recently argued that “no truths are analytic in the epis-
temological sense” [Williamson 2006, 8]. 8 So before we can rest assured that
we do in fact have conceptual knowledge, I need to review Williamson’s case. 9
Williamson argues that “[f]or even the simplest candidates for analytic-
ity or conceptual truth, understanding is consistent with considered rejection”
[Williamson 2006, 32]. Consider Peter, an expert logician who holds the odd
view that universal quantification in English is existentially committing in that:
“There is at least one F ” is a necessary condition for the truth of “Every F is
G”. 10 Peter has also been swayed by a curious conspiracy theory to believe that
there are no vixens. Since he holds that the existential commitment of “Every
vixen is a vixen” is not fulfilled, Peter neither assents to “Every vixen is a vixen”,
nor believes the thought it expresses.
According to Williamson, Peter nevertheless understands this sentence and
grasps the thought it expresses. Peter understands ‘vixen’ just as we do, taking
it to be synonymous to ‘female fox’. He also understands the mode of combina-
tion used in “Every vixen is a vixen”. More importantly still, Peter understands
the English ‘every’ occurring in “Every vixen is a vixen”. He is a native English
speaker with a standard learning history whose conception makes little differ-
ence in practice—since Peter classifies what we consider a pragmatic presuppo-
sition as a logical inference, we usually do not even notice his deviation. Peter
is also not trying to reform our language. He intends his theory to capture the
meaning of ‘every’ in English, and he agrees to revise his account if he is proven
wrong on this. What is peculiar about Peter thus is his logical theory, not his
understanding, and as Williamson stresses:
Giving an incorrect theory of the meaning of a word is not the same
as using the word with an idiosyncratic sense. [Williamson 2006,
12]
Williamson concludes that neither “Every vixen is a vixen”, nor “Every vixen
is a female fox” is epistemically analytic. He maintains that this line of thought
smoothly generalizes. Since we can find some ‘logical unorthodoxy’ [Williamson
2006, 32] in any single case, there simply are no epistemic analyticities.
By way of reply, note first that Peter is acutely aware of how he uses ‘every’,
as well as of the fact that his use differs from ours. In fact, Williamson stipulates
that Peter’s “refusal to accept [‘Every vixen is a vixen’] as true is stable under
conscious reflection, exposure to further arguments and the like” [Williamson
8. Williamson presents the very same case in very much the same words in chapter 4
of his [Williamson 2007]. I stick to the original paper.
9. For a more elaborate development of the case presented here, see [Nimtz 2009].
See also [Balcerak Jackson 2009] for objections to Williamson’s line of thought.
10. I focus throughout on one of Williamson’s two examples.
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2006, 16]. Hence, in clear contrast to the way we use ‘every’, Peter reflectively
employs the terms such that his “Every F is G” entails “There is at least one F ”.
The deliberate and reflected use Peter makes of ‘every’ accords, moreover, with
his theory. We thus find that the use Peter makes of ‘every’ fits his own theory,
but systematically deviates from how we use that term.
This marked difference in considered and theory-guided use gives us every
reason to conclude that Peter’s “Every F is G” differ in truth-conditions of our
“Every F isG”. Since everyone agrees that a difference in truth-conditions makes
for a difference in thought expressed, we find that ‘every’ in Peter’s mouth does
differ in sense from ‘every’ in our mouths. Pace Williamson, Peter thus attaches
an idiosyncratic sense to ‘every’, and he does so precisely because his theory
accords with him using it in an idiosyncratic fashion. Williamson rightly points
out that holding an incorrect theory of a word’s meaning is not the same as using
the word in an idiosyncratic sense. But he does not appreciate the fact that the
former can be a sure sign of the latter if the incorrect theory conforms to, or even
shapes the speaker’s reflected use. This is precisely what we find in Peter’s case. I
therefore conclude that Peter does not grasp the thought we express with “Every
vixen is a vixen”. Hence, we have no reason to believe that not even this simple
logical truth amounts to an epistemological analyticity.
Williamson tries to preempt this line of thought in two different ways. On
the one hand, he emphasizes that ‘every’ in Peter’s mouth must mean the same
as it does in our mouths; after all, we all speak English. On a strict Lewisian in-
dividuation of natural languages [Lewis 1975], this does indeed follow. But
Williamson employs far more lenient criteria for speaking the same natural
language, viz., fluency of communication [Williamson 2006, 11f] and non-
deviant first acquisition [Williamson 2006, 13], as he needs to do to bestow
prima facie plausibility on his idea that Peter speaks the same language as we
do. And on these criteria, sameness of natural language does not guarantee
sameness of meaning.
This fits well with the natural languages we know. Consider e.g., the term
‘hat’. According to the OED, there are two uses of this word. On the former,
a hat is almost any covering for the head. On the latter, a hat is a specific
kind of headgear that typically has “a more or less horizontal brim all round the
hemispherical, conical, or cylindrical part which covers the head”. Thus there
might well be a community of English speakers whose members exclusively use
‘hat’ in the former sense, and one whose members exclusively use ‘hat’ in the
latter sense. The overlap in the senses would allow ordinary communication to
proceed by and large smoothly. Still, the communities would use ‘hat’ in different
senses. Meaning can thus cut finer than shared natural language. 11 Hence, the
11. Discussing the idea that concepts are much more finely individuated than linguistic
meanings, Williamson argues that it creates methodological issues such as:
to which concept does the phrase ‘the concept square’ refer to if the word
‘square’, with its usual meaning in English, is associated with different
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fact that we all speak English is consistent with the fact that ‘every’ in Peter’s
mouth means something different from what it means in our mouths.
On the other hand, Williamson thinks that a homophonic rendering of
Peter’s: “Every vixen is a vixen” is more faithful to his intentions than any non-
homophonic reading. After all, Peter’s logical theory attempts to capture our
shared meaning of ‘every’. From this Williamson concludes that Peter associates
the sentence: “Every vixen is a vixen” with “the same thought as we do in any
relevant sense of ‘thought”’ [Williamson 2006, 25]. But that inference is flawed.
In most contexts, we report homophonically because the differences in truth-
conditions do not matter. And in contexts where these differences do matter,
we report homophonically because we lack a word expressing Peter’s sense of
‘every’. 12 But when it matters, we flag the differences: “Peter denies that ev-
ery vixen is a vixen. You see, the way he uses ‘every’ is such that such a claim
is true only if there are some of these things, and Peter believes that there are
no vixens.” In writing we can easily devise a new term, and we would not
hesitate to distinguish our ‘every1’ from Peter’s ‘every2’. There is nothing pater-
nalistic about this. We have diagnosed a simple difference in use and meaning,
and highlight it.
Please note that a difference is all we need. We hold that “Every vixen is
a vixen” is a conceptual truth in our community because we think it obvious
that we use ‘every’ in the sense of ‘every1’. Peter’s challenge might prompt us
to reflect about the way we do and would use ‘every’ in order to determine
whether the seemingly innocuous “Every vixen is a vixen” is indeed analytic in
our community. But the fact that Peter’s challenge prompts us to re-assess our
judgment as to how we employ the term across possible situations does not imply
that “Every vixen is a vixen” is not a conceptual truth in our community. Even
less does it follow that since such a challenge is possible in any single case, there
are no epistemic analyticities. This merely implies that our judgements about
which statements are conceptual truths are generally defeasible.
Yet that is granted anyway. There might always be a queer possible situ-
ation we have not thought of—as I have stressed above, our armchair-based
accounts of the notions guiding our considered application are typically conjec-
tural, always defeasible and very often provisional. But Peter does not draw
our attention to a possible situation contemplation on which is expected to con-
vince us that we, at least sometimes, employ “Every F is G” such that it entails
“There are Fs”. He maintains that we are wrong about the semantics of ‘ev-
ery’ in our mouths although we know perfectly well how we do and would use that
term. Please recall that Williamson stipulates that Peter’s refusal to accept “Every
concepts in the minds of different speakers of English at one time (. . . )?
[Williamson 2003, 271f]
But the claim is that meaning can cut finer than shared natural language, not that it must
cut finer.
12. See [Segal 2000, 76–83] for an argument along these lines.
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vixen is a vixen” is stable under reflection, exposure to further arguments, and
the like. By parity of reasoning, we can assume that our refusal to give in to
Peter’s account is likewise stable such that learning more about how we do and
would use ‘every’ won’t change our verdict either.
I conclude that Williamson hasn’t established that there are no epistemic
analyticities. A fortiori, he hasn’t shown that there is no conceptual knowledge.
In the light of the positive case offered in the last section, we can rest assured
that we do in fact have conceptual knowledge. The first premise of the simple
argument still stands tall, or so I maintain.
5 From conceptual truths to metaphysical
necessities, or the argument from strong
possibilities
Turning to the second premise of the simple argument, I need to show that
(2) Any item of conceptual knowledge we so possess either ipso facto is knowl-
edge of a metaphysical necessity. Or the conceptual knowledge we are con-
cerned with is such that we can reliably determine that it does not lead to
metaphysically modal knowledge.
Here is a quick argument for this premise. We do have knowledge of concep-
tual truths, or so the first premise of the simple argument assures us. Given
the distinctions made in § 3 above, we know that a conceptual truth amounts
to a statement that holds true across all counter-actual or A-worlds (in symbols:
◻AS). But any such conceptually necessary statement is ipso facto metaphysi-
cally necessary in that it holds true across all counterfactual or C-worlds as well
(in symbols: ◻CS). That is to say, the following principle I dub the ‘NN-Rule’
holds true:
(NN) If statement S is conceptually necessary, S is metaphysically necessary as
well (in symbols: ◻AS → ◻CS)
On the NN-rule, then, conceptual necessities are directly convertible into meta-
physical necessities. Hence, premise (2) holds true in virtue of its first disjunct
holding true: Any item of conceptual knowledge we possess ipso facto is knowl-
edge of a metaphysical necessity.
The quick argument clearly is too quick. It presumes that there are no de-
featers to the NN-rule. But Kripke [Kripke 1980, 53–56] has shown that we find
statements that defeat it. Consider: “The standard meter is one meter long at
t0.” Although this statement expresses a conceptual truth, it is metaphysically
contingent rather than metaphysically necessary. It thus defeats the NN-rule.
But if there are defeaters to the NN-rule, we cannot rely on it to convert some
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conceptual truth S we have arrived at by conceptual reflection into a metaphys-
ical necessity. For how can we make sure that S does belong to the statements
the NN-rule holds true for?
So the quick argument won’t do. But something very much like it will do,
for all exceptions to the NN-rule are identifiable in advance, or so I will argue.
That is to say, the NN-rule fails only for statements for which we can know, by
armchair semantic consideration, that it fails for them. All defeaters of the NN-
rule thus are harmless. If this is true, then we can decide, for any conceptual
necessity we find, whether it yields a metaphysical necessity, or whether it is a
defeater to the NN-rule. Conceptual reflection thus puts us in a position to safely
derive metaphysical necessities from insights gained by conceptual analysis.
Please note that distinguishing between counter-actual or A-worlds and
counterfactual or C-worlds allows us to distinguish two kinds of truth-conditions,
and hence two kinds of contents encapsulating those. On the one hand, there
are counter-actual truth-conditions—A-contents, for short. These capture the
conceptual dimension in that, as rehearsed above, a statement S is conceptu-
ally necessary iff it holds true in all A-worlds. On the other hand, there are the
more familiar counterfactual truth-conditions—the C-contents, for short. These
capture the metaphysical dimension in that, as already explained, a statement
S is metaphysically necessary iff it holds true in all counterfactual or C-worlds.
Any defeater of the NN-rule must hence be such that its A-contents are necessary
whereas its C-contents aren’t. So let us consider what could make a statement’s
counterfactual and counter-actual truth-conditions differ. Two answers to this
are widely discussed.
The first idea is this: A statement’s counterfactual and counter-actual
truth-conditions may differ if the statement contains actuality-dependent terms.
Actuality-dependent expressions such as ‘here’, ‘water’ or ‘one meter’ desig-
nate rigidly whatever actual extension their A-contents carve out. This might
well make that their C-contents deviate from their A-contents. A statement’s
C-content may hence differ from its A-content because it contains actuality-
dependent terms. 13 This yields clear defeaters for the NN-rule. Actuality-
dependence brings about a posteriori necessities such as “Water is H2O” with
‘water’ rigidly designating the substance ‘water’ actually applies to. Actuality
dependence also brings about a priori contingencies such as “The standard me-
ter is one meter long at t0.” The latter combine a necessary A-content with
a contingent C-content and hence defeats (NN). Yet these defeaters are harm-
less. Since we can diagnose actuality-dependence by armchair semantic con-
siderations, statements whose C- and A-contents deviate because they comprise
actuality-dependent terms are recognizable from the armchair. Given that we
13. May, but need not. For many actuality-dependent sentences it holds true that if they
are conceptually necessary, they are metaphysically necessary. Consider e.g., “Water is the
actual watery stuff of our acquaintance” or “One meter is the actual length of the standard
meter at t0.”
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reflect on that matter, and given that we are alert to the possibility that apri-
ority and metaphysical necessity may come apart, we simply won’t mistake a
priori contingencies such as “The standard meter is one meter long at t0” for
metaphysical necessities.
Neo-descriptivists hold that actuality-dependence is the only reason for a
statement’s C- and A-contents to differ, and thus the only source of a posteriori
necessities. Quite a few philosophers reject this claim. This brings us to the
second idea as to how a statement’s counterfactual and counter-actual truth-
conditions may come apart. Advocates of so-called strong necessities hold that
“God exists”, “e = mc2”, or the key materialist claim ◻(PHY S → PHEN) 14
state a posteriori necessities, although they do not contain actuality-dependent
terms and we judge them to be false in some A-world [Chalmers 2002, 189–
192], [Kallestrup 2006]. For any such statement S, it holds true that ◻CS&¬◻A
S. Hence, any strong necessity is putative example of a non-actuality-dependent
statement whose A- and C-contents nonetheless differ.
Chalmers [Chalmers 2010], [Chalmers 2002, 189–194] argues that there
are no strong necessities. He points out that we have no reason to think that
the examples given are metaphysically necessary in the first place, that strong
necessities presuppose inexplicable brute modal facts, and that their existence
would require the space of A-worlds to outrun the space of C-worlds. This fact
would violate modal monism on which A- and C-world are the same worlds
viewed under different perspectives. But modal monism provides a prima facie
highly plausible account of modal space, and it is less opulent than any picture
assuming A- and C-worlds to be different entities. So Chalmers concludes that
we have good reason to think that there are no strong necessities.
Still, many philosophers maintain that things are different when it comes to
the phenomenal, and they accept that ◻(PHY S → PHEN) is a strong neces-
sity. They argue that we have good reasons to uphold physicalism and reject
mind-body dualism, and they provide a theory of phenomenal concepts to ex-
plain how strong necessities involving those concepts come about [Tye 2003]. I
am rather wary of this line of argument, 15 and I consider strong necessities to
be rather dubious. But let us for the moment acknowledge them. Let us agree
that there are as many strong necessities as you like. How does this affect the
case to be made here in support of premise (2) of our simple argument?
Acknowledging strong necessities does not affect this case at all. For strong
necessities do not affect the NN-rule. Actuality-dependence yields defeaters to
the NN-rule that are harmless. Strong necessities are far from harmless. We
won’t learn that some statement expresses a strong necessity by armchair se-
mantic considerations. But strong necessities do not defeat (NN). Put simply,
if there are strong necessities, there are more A-worlds than C-worlds: Since
14. Here ‘PHYS’ abbreviates a statement that reports all actual (micro-)physical facts
and ‘PHEN’ abbreviates a statement that reports all actual phenomenal facts.
15. See [Horgan & Tienson 2001] for a general argument against these views.
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a strong necessity S is true in all C-worlds but false in some A-worlds, these
A-worlds cannot be C-worlds. But if there are more A- than C-worlds, arguing
from the truth of “God does not exist” or “PHYS &¬ PHEN” in some A-world to
their truth in some C-world becomes problematic. Strong necessities thus would
defeat the following principle I dub the ‘PP-Rule’:
(PP) If statement S is conceptually possible, S is metaphysically possible as well
(in symbols: ◊AS → ◊CS).
This would be significant enough. But it would not affect the NN-rule. The
NN-rule entails that ◊CS → ◊AS holds true. This rule cannot be invalidated by
statements falsifying the converse ◊AS → ◊CS.
So we find that neither of the reasons the current debate contemplates for
a statement’s C-content to deviate from its A-content yields harmful defeaters
for the NN-rule. This was to be expected. Any harmful defeater to (NN) would
have to be a non-actuality dependent statement stating a metaphysical contin-
gency that we nevertheless judge to be true in all A-worlds. In other words,
any harmful defeater to (NN) would have to be a strong possibility. Only for
strong possibilities S does ◻AS&¬ ◻C S hold true in spite of the absence of any
actuality-dependent terms, which is what we would need for defeater of (NN)
that we cannot diagnose by armchair semantic reflection.
To my knowledge, no one has ever defended strong possibilities, or produced
a single example. What is more, anyone who recognizes metaphysical necessity
has good reasons to doubt that there are any strong possibilities.
First of all, suppose someone takes “Some grandmothers aren’t female” to
state a strong possibility. She has to hold that (i) “All grandmothers are female”
is conceptually necessary, that (ii) there nevertheless are metaphysically possible
worlds with non-female grandmothers, and that (iii) “All grandmothers are fe-
male” does not function like “Water is watery”, since neither ‘grandmother’ nor
‘female’ is actuality-dependent. But taken together, (ii) and (iii) seem to contra-
dict (i). Our speaker seems to hold that there is some possible situation correctly
describable as containing non-female grandmothers and to hold that there is no
possible situation correctly describable as containing non-female grandmothers
whilst agreeing that ‘female grandmother’ applies to precisely the same objects
in both possible situations.
Secondly, to hold that there is a statement S such that ◻AS&¬ ◻C S is to
agree that there is a statement S′ such that ¬◊AS′&◊CS′. To accept strong pos-
sibilities is thus to accept that some conceptual impossibilities are metaphysically
possible. But everyone treats conceptual impossibility as sufficient for metaphys-
ical impossibility. No one who grants that: “There are round squares” or “There
are married bachelors” are conceptually impossible (and non-actuality depen-
dent) thinks that we still need to check whether they are metaphysically possi-
ble. That is exactly right. If there are Moorean facts about modality, that there
cannot be a metaphysically possible world in which a conceptual impossibility
holds true is clearly one of them.
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Finally, if there are strong possibilities, there are more C-worlds than A-
worlds: Since a strong possibility S is false in some C-worlds but true in all
A-worlds, these C-worlds cannot be A-worlds. So if there are strong possibilities,
there are metaphysically possible worlds that are conceptually impossible. An
advocate of strong possibilities thus had to avow that metaphysical necessity
outruns conceptual necessity. This would mean to embrace modal dualism. It
would also run counter to everything we thought we knew about how conceptual
and metaphysical modality are related. Anyone who acknowledges metaphysical
modality at all will agree that although modal space may have some unexpected
features, it cannot deviate that much from how we think it is.
I conclude that there are no strong possibilities. Consequently, there are
no harmful defeaters to the NN-rule. Hence, premise (2) of the simple argu-
ment holds good. By consequence, the conceptual knowledge we possess reli-
ably yields knowledge of metaphysical necessities.
6 Wrapping up, or modal knowledge and
metaphysical ambition
I have argued that there are conceptual truths we know since we know what
our terms semantically apply to. Yet any such conceptually true statement S
we know either ipso facto provides us with knowledge of a metaphysical neces-
sity. This holds true if S is conceptually necessary and does not comprise any
actuality-dependent term. Or S comprises at least one actuality-dependent ex-
pression, making its extension across counterfactual worlds dependent on (as
a rule) contingent actual fact. Then our knowledge of S does not provide us
with knowledge of a metaphysical necessity. But since we can uncover actuality-
dependence by armchair semantic reflection, we are in a position to know that
S does not ipso facto amount to a metaphysical necessity. Hence, our ordinary
knowledge of conceptual truths, knowledge we possess since we know what
(many of) our terms semantically apply to, is a reliable epistemic source of, and
hence a reliable route to, knowledge of metaphysical necessities.
This argument relies neither on an extravagant theory of concept possession,
nor on fancy ideas about matters modal. The claim that we do possess concep-
tual knowledge rests on what appears to be a broad consensus in semantics, viz.
that we often do know what our terms semantically apply to, since we know how
we do and would apply them. And as for modal part, no one granting that: “You
do not know that p if p is false”, “Neighbours have neighbours”, “Uncles are rel-
atives” or “Hats are coverings of the head” express conceptual necessities goes
on to wonder whether these statements may still be false at some metaphysi-
cally possible world or other—unless, that is, she suspects a somewhat hidden
actuality-dependence. There thus de facto is something like a consensus that
conceptual knowledge allows us to uncover metaphysical necessities.
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Since there is no reason to think that ways to acquire modal knowledge are
mutually exclusive, you still might want to explore alternative epistemic routes
to modal truth. You might try to gather modal knowledge from conceivability
[Yablo 1993], [Chalmers 2002], from our empirically informed ability to pass
counterfactual judgment [Williamson 2007, chap. 5], or from inferences to best
explanation [Biggs 2011]. But is there any need to do so, now that we know
that we can rely on our ordinary conceptual knowledge? That depends on how
grand your metaphysical ambitions are. If you are content with metaphysically
modal insights such as the ones concerning circles, knowledge, neighbours, un-
cles and hats paraded above together with a posteriori necessities such as “Water
is H2O’ or “Hesperus = Phosphorus” derived from conceptual truths in tandem
with empirical discoveries, you won’t feel much pressure to do so. Yet if you are a
staunch believer in more ambitious metaphysical necessities such as, say, the ne-
cessity of origin or substance, or if you wish to uncover metaphysical possibilities
(that aren’t metaphysically necessary), I fear you will want to keep looking. 16
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